INTRODUCTION
This regional development was carried out as an integral part of national development that was carried out through regional autonomy, so it provided opportunities for increasing democracy and regional performance. The implementation of autonomy was also useful in enhancing the welfare of the community towards an active and democratic civil society, for this reason, the community participation, openness and accountability to society are needed.
To support the implementation of regional autonomy through the provision of financing sources based on the principle of decentralization, it was necessary to regulate the financial balance between the central and regional governments in the form of a financial system. This financial system is used to finance the decentralization work program implemented in areas commonly referred as the Regional Budget (APBD). During the election of regional heads, incumbent of regional heads tended to commit political bribery, to purchases the voters and taking various types of shopping and grants to cover a very large campaign expenditure (Dahlberg & Johansson, 2002) .
However, during the second period where regional heads cannot be re-elected, regional heads will tend to commit corruption in order to seek a collateral when the position is stepped down (Ferraz & Finan, 2011) . The regional head who ends his leadership period and will go back to becoming a candidate for regional head will tend to use policy funds (discetionary funds) to increase his popularity in order to be reelected in the next period (Sjahrir, Kis-katos, & Schulze, 2013) .
Allegations of potential APBD irregularities will increase when the regional head re-nominates after his leadership period or incumbent, considering that they have to compete again, as not to lose the power. Incumbent will make changes in the composition of the budget to influence the voters (Drazen & Eslava, 2006) . This can be seen from the needs of regional heads when conducting campaigns to be re-elected in the next period, so that the regional head will take various kinds of shopping and grants from other parties and will make a vote purchase to be re-elected (Dahlberg & Johansson, 2002) . Grant Expenditures and Social Assistance Expenditures, is one of the expenditure posts that can be used by candidates for incumbent regional heads to lure the hearts of voters to get support. Incumbent will make changes to the composition of the budget to influence the voters (Drazen & Eslava, 2006 Based on that data, the author wants to see the reality that happened and conclude whether there is indeed a use of discretionary funds before and during the 2015 regional head general election in Samarinda City and is that an incumbent effort in the form of a political strategy to increase electability, maintain an incumbent voice base or something other. This study examined in the regulation, implementation and looks at aspects of grant and Bansos budgeting. Therefore, in this study, the author asks two questions. First, how was the allocation of discretionary funds before and during the Pemilukada? How was discretionary fund allocation compared to regional financial conditions? Then, how is the allocation of regional discretionary funds between the region that carry out Pemilukada with incumbent candidates, with the regions that do not implement Pemilukada?
Based on the description above, the researcher tries to link the legitimacy theory and agency theory. The emergence of legitimacy theory begins with an organization / company that seeks to establish harmony between social and environmental values with their business activities so that norms of business behavior can be accepted in a larger social system in which they are a part. This theory becomes important when applied to the public sector, especially social acceptance of government organizations led by regional heads who are legitimized by their people. Legitimacy according to Suchman, (1995) The application of legitimacy theory in the public sector can be seen when the regional head maintains legitimacy in order to be re-elected in the second period and not to lose from the otential competitors by trying as much as possible to draw sympathy from the people in various ways. One of choice is to provide grants and social assistance to improve its image in the community before the Pemilukada.
According to the relationship between Ritonga & Alam's theory of agency and budgeting, (Ritonga & Alam, 2010) , it can be seen as a transaction in the form of a mandate contract given to agents (executives) within the framework of institutional structures with different levels. In accordance with what is stated in the agency theory, that principals and agents have their own interests, so that conflicts over these interests have the potential to occur at any time. The agent has the ability to further highlight his interests because he has more information than the principal, this is because the agent is in operational control in the field. So the agent prefers alternatives that benefit him, by deceiving and imposing losses on the principal Fozard, S., (2001) in Ritonga & Alam, (2010) This research was a qualitative descriptive study. This research was conducted in the City of Samarinda. This location was chosen because the author portrays the increasing discretionary fund phenomenon in the lead up to the 2015 post-conflict local election. This study used interactive model data analysis
A. Research Focus
The focus or indicators measured in this study are:
1. Allocation of discretionary funds before and during the Pemilukada.
2. Allocation of discretionary fund compared to regional financial conditions.
Differencies between allocation of regional discretionary funds that carry out
Pemilukada with incumbent candidates with the regions that do not implement Pemilukada.
B. Data Collection Techniques
Data collection techniques in this study used triangulation methods which are done by comparing information or data in different ways. To obtain the truth of reliable information and a complete picture of certain information, researchers used interviews and observations to check the truth. In addition, researchers also used different informants to check the truth of the information. Through various perspectives it is hoped that results can be obtained close to the truth. Therefore, this stage of triangulation is carried out if the data or information obtained from the subject or research informant is in doubt.
C. Analysis Tools
This study used an interactive model data analysis introduced by Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, (2014) , where there were three activities that occur simultaneously; data condensation, presentation of concluding data, and verification.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Spending on social assistance grants and expenditures is a shopping outpost that can be used for incumbent candidates to lure the voters to get votes. This reason According to Halim & Kusufi, (2012) , opportunistic of incumbent candidates in the process of drafting the APBD ahead of the implementation of the Regional Head General Election were very strong. As an incumbent candidate, the regional head that will compete in Pemilukada has a great opportunity to utilize spending posts on the APBD for their interests. The APBD drafting process begins with proposals submitted by executives (Regional Governments) which are indicated to be of the highest importance to executive interests. With the superiority of power it has, the incumbent will tend to propose a budget that can enlarge its agency, both financially and non-financially.
Minister of Home Affairs, Tjahjo Kumolo, even stated that Bansos funds had increased by 1000 percent before the implementation of regional elections. He added that there were 89 regions that increased to 1000 percent in the Indonesian Forum data for Budget Transparency (FITRA), ICW, and the Ministry of Home Affairs' Finance Director. The second level APBD for the Regency and City is jointly approved by the Governor, Regent, Mayor, and DPRD so that data negotiation is very vulnerable. Data obtained by the election monitoring agency shows an increase in the number of social assistance funds and grants in the APBD whose regional heads advanced in the 2015 General Election, so that the increase was considered to be potentially misused to carry out money politics.
A. Discretionary Fund Allocation Before and During the Regional Election
The trend of increasing discretionary funds that also occurred in the city of After the post-conflict local election period, there was a significant decrease of 74.6%, but there was an increase in social assistance spending accounts of 47%. For more details, the allocation of the Bansos of Samarinda City can be seen in the graph below: However, the goods shopping account managed by 100 Technical SKPD is handed over to the community, namely farmer groups and business groups, which is a separate problem in the RPJMD of agriculture and plantations, not a priority program, but the budget allocation that given is very large. This is also an indication of the incumbent's use of discretionary funds as an agent who has legitimacy in the government for the sake of his popularity in the 2015 Pemilukada.
The granting of grants and Bansos must hold on to the principles of justice, propriety, rationality, and broad benefits for the community so that they are far from personal and group interests, and political interests of the elements of local followed by candidate wins incumbent. Executives who were agents receive authority and exercise authority and also have discretionary power that can be utilized to maintain their position in the government by using discretionary funds that can be freely channeled due to indirect types of spending. With an indication of the incumbent's APBD utilization for its candidacy again, the government needs to make a tighter control on spending on aid and social assistance expenditures starting from the procedures for budgeting, implementation, reporting and control. However, the use of public funds is disguised as a populist policy / program so that it has a legal basis and the consequences are not easily accused of abuse of power or election violations.
B. Discretionary fund allocation compared to regional financial conditions
Permendagri Number 32 of 2011 jo. Permendagri No. 39 of 2012 Article 4 and Article 22 states that the allocation of the budget for grants and social assistance must take into account the regional financial capacity after prioritizing the fulfillment of obligatory affairs expenditure by taking into account the principles of justice, propriety, rationality, and benefits for the community. Regional financial capability in terms of budget perspective as a managerial control tool states that the government has enough money to fulfill its obligations 9 [9].
Thus, the financial capacity of this region can be measured by fiscal space.
Fiscal space is a concept to measure the flexibility that local governments have in allocating APBD to finance activities that are regional priorities. The greater the fiscal space that an area has, the greater the flexibility that local governments have to allocate their expenditure. Based on research 10 [10], fiscal space has a positive influence on the performance of local government, but on the contrary it can be used as an opportunity to commit corruption. The allocation of expenditure on grants and social assistance with the personal motives of the head of the region is also an indication of undercover corruption.
The amount of budget allocation for grant and social assistance expenditure was inseparable from the characteristics of each region. Research 11 [11] states that of several characteristics of local government, namely the independence ratio, human development index, legislative size, and status; only status that affects the allocation of social assistance spending.
In 2013-2015 the financial condition of Samarinda City continued to experience a budget deficit, but continued to allocate discretionary funds which basically disrupted the budget performance that had been prepared without paying attention to mandatory and non-compliance. So this reinforces the alleged use of the incumbent's discretionary fund for his candidacy again. More can be seen in the graph below: Whereas social assistance spending has decreased, for more details can be seen in the notes below : With an indication of the incumbent's APBD utilization for its candidacy again, there should be stricter supervision by both DPRD members and the Government Internal Supervisory Apparatus (APIP) on the allocation and realization of grant and social assistance expenditures especially towards the political year to be right on target. Researchers also suggest restrictions on the allocation of expenditure on grants and social assistance based on the ability of regional finances (fiscal space) as outlined in government regulation policies as improvements to existing rules so that the allocation of grant and social assistance budgets is controlled through a system of rules.
CONCLUSION
Based on the discussion that has been done, the conclusion of this study are:
1. Allocation of regional discretionary funds with incumbent candidates before and during Pemilukada experienced a drastic increase in the lead up to Pemilukada and social assistance spending decreased by a tendency to fluctuate but there were findings of the allocation of goods expenditure in 2015 distributed through 100
Technical SKPD of Rp. 504, 938, 020, 140.34 to the public at a time when regional financial conditions are in deficit.
2. There is an increase in expenditure on grant and social assistance spending, still occurring despite the financial condition of the 2013-2015 budget deficit. This is an indication that the incumbent is trying to keep providing assistance to attract voters' interest on Pemilukada in 2015.
3. Furthermore, the proportion of the allocation of discretionary funds in the implementing regions of Pemilukada with incumbent candidates is greater than the proportion of discretionary funds in regions that do not implement Pemilukada. Based on the conclusions drawn from the research findings, it is suspected that there is a political discretionary fund by the incumbent for its political interests.
